“It is an event of global significance, for we are imparting to the dismantling of the infrastructure of fear that has ruled the world, a momentum which is so powerful that it will be hard to stop.”
— Mikhail Gorbachev, 1991
In the final act of the Cold War, as the ideological divide between East and West began to melt, a more existential shadow still loomed: the spectre of nuclear annihilation. The START Treaty, forged in the waning years of the 20th century, became the legal and moral architecture to dismantle that fear.
For nearly half a century, the United States and the Soviet Union had pointed enough firepower at each other to erase humanity many times over. Silos concealed death in prairies and tundras. Submarines roamed the deep with payloads that could turn cities to ash. Deterrence was doctrine; destruction was the backup plan.
Yet, even as Cold War rhetoric thundered on, the soil beneath geopolitics was shifting.
A Cold War Thaw — The Gamble at Reykjavik
In October 1986, a windswept Reykjavik became the unlikely stage for one of the boldest diplomatic encounters of the century. U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev met not to sign a treaty, but to dream of one.
Gorbachev arrived with a radical Soviet plan: the total liquidation of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, based on the 15 January 1986 initiative. His instructions were clear—achieve a breakthrough. His team, including trusted advisor Chernyaev, was told to prioritize strategic disarmament over more traditional arms control debates. “Gorbachev’s ultimate goal for Reykjavik… is total liquidation of nuclear weapons… He reiterates it several times…”
Reagan, however, stood firm on one immovable principle: the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), or “Star Wars” — a space-based missile shield he believed would secure a future free of nuclear terror. “Even if we eliminated all nuclear weapons,” he argued, “wouldn’t we want to have protection against a madman with one missile?”
To the Soviets, SDI was an enabler of first strike. To Reagan, it was a gas mask in a chemical-free world.
The negotiations stretched through sleepless nights. Soviet General Akhromeev and U.S. negotiator Nitze argued for hours. A document drafted on October 12 captured deep gaps but failed to incorporate the progress made just a day earlier. Georgy Arbatov, speaking with a bluntness born of Cold War realism, told Nitze: “What you are offering requires an exceptional level of trust. We cannot accept your position.”
The mistrust was mutual and immovable.
As the summit faltered, Reagan reached across the abyss. “I think you didn’t want to achieve an agreement anyway… I don’t know when we’ll ever have another chance like this,” he said — a plea, recorded in Soviet transcripts but missing from the American version.
Yet Reykjavik, though unfinished, was not a failure. Gorbachev emerged more determined than ever: “I am now even more of an optimist after Reykjavik… Reykjavik signifies a new stage in the process of disarmament — from limitations to total abolition.”
The Collapse in Slow Motion — A Treaty Amidst Upheaval
By 1990, the world had started to break its own chains. The Berlin Wall had crumbled. Eastern European capitals shed their Soviet shackles. The Warsaw Pact staggered toward obsolescence. Within the USSR, the Communist Party’s grip loosened daily.
But the missiles remained.
Gorbachev believed the START Treaty could be more than a stabilizer—it could be a new narrative for cooperation amid chaos. In June 1990, at the Washington Summit, Gorbachev and President George H. W. Bush released a joint statement affirming their shared commitment to completing START by year’s end. “They reaffirmed their determination to have the Treaty completed and ready for signature by the end of this year.”
Describing it as “a major landmark,” both leaders envisioned START as the cornerstone of a more stable world. It was to fulfill the Malta Summit’s vision and forge a post-Cold War relationship grounded in verification and trust.
The Signing Ceremony — A Treaty With History Itself
On July 31, 1991, beneath the gilded ceilings of St. George Hall in the Kremlin, the ink dried on what was perhaps the most ambitious arms control treaty in history. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty—START—was signed.
Gorbachev, speaking from the edge of political collapse, called it “a process with unprecedented scope and objectives… a moral achievement, a major breakthrough in our country’s thinking and behavior.”
Bush offered a sober tribute to years of patient diplomacy: “The treaty that we sign today is a most complicated one… START makes that a reality. By reducing arms, we reverse a half-century of steadily growing strategic arsenals.”
Unknown to the world, the Soviet Union would cease to exist within five months. But START, against all odds, would endure.
Behind the Scenes — Negotiations, Nuance, and Verification
START wasn’t built in a day. It took nine years, multiple summits, and more than a dozen technical documents to shape what would become the backbone of post-Cold War arms control.
From 1982 to 1991, negotiators hashed out thousands of clauses in Geneva, Moscow, and Washington. The treaty included 17 articles and nine annexes—covering definitions, notifications, telemetry sharing, and protocols for conversion, elimination, and verification. Every missile, silo, and bomber was to be counted, declared, and monitored.
Key obligations included:
- Reducing deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers to 1,600
- Limiting warheads to 6,000
- Cutting throw-weight to half the Soviet 1988 total
Inspections were rigorous. Mobile ICBM production sites were subject to continuous monitoring. Telemetry from test flights had to be shared—unencrypted. Inspectors could visit suspect sites, verify elimination procedures, and examine launcher canisters to ensure treaty compliance.
Each clause of START made secrecy harder and trust more tangible.
Effectiveness and Implementation
Though signed in 1991, START didn’t enter into force until December 5, 1994—delayed by the Soviet collapse and the challenge of integrating new nuclear states like Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.
These states inherited parts of the Soviet arsenal, but under the Lisbon Protocol, each agreed to denuclearize and join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. Warheads were transferred to Russia, and START’s framework expanded accordingly.
The results were staggering:
- The U.S. reduced its deployed warheads from 8,824 (1994) to 5,576 (2009)
- Russia dropped from 9,548 to 3,309 over the same period
- Both sides cut delivery systems to under the 1,600 cap
Inspections unfolded regularly. Russian and American officers stood on former enemy soil, watching each other dismantle the engines of annihilation.
Breaches, Backlash, and Endurance
START was tested by more than time. Mobile ICBMs, prized by Russia for survivability, were seen by the U.S. as destabilizing. Disputes over classification and verification strained trust.
In 2002, the U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Russia had warned in 1991 that such a move could justify withdrawal from START—but ultimately stayed in.
Tensions flared again in 2014 when the U.S. accused Russia of violating the INF Treaty. Russia countered with its own accusations, charging the U.S. with deploying adaptable offensive systems in Europe.
Through it all, START endured.
Legacy — A Template for the Future
Though it expired in 2009, START I’s legacy was immediate and lasting. New START, signed in 2010, inherited its spirit and many of its protocols.
START institutionalized:
- Data exchanges on strategic forces
- On-site inspections of sensitive systems
- Open telemetry sharing
- A Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
It normalized transparency. It proved that arms control could be implemented with discipline rather than just hope.
Conclusion: The Beginning of the End of the End
The Reykjavik talks may have ended in disappointment, but they sparked a fire. That fire fuelled years of negotiation, outlived the Soviet Union, and dismantled thousands of nuclear weapons—not with war, but with protocol.
START was never just a treaty. It was a contract with history. It showed that two superpowers—long locked in existential hostility—could meet, reason, compromise, and verify.
By 2001, American warheads had been reduced to 5,949. Russian warheads stood at 5,518. Bombers were converted. Silos sealed. And inspectors, clipboards in hand, bore witness to the rollback of Armageddon.
START did not end nuclear danger. But it ended the illusion that such danger was inevitable.
And in that, it became something rare: a moment when diplomacy won—not by chance, but by choice.
Interested to know more about the historic events that led to our current global turmoil, please check out my book: “Global Hegemony A Strategic Illusion”.
Why This Book Matters Now
With the world once again teetering on the edge of geopolitical rupture, this book is a must-read for scholars, diplomats, strategists—and every citizen who dares to ask, “How did we get here?”
This is your invitation to step behind the veil of power and witness how the illusion was built.
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